Litigation & arbitration
Annulment of an arbitral award: the Cairo Court of Appeal ruling of 3 June 2020
Comment on the ruling of the Cairo Court of Appeal issued on June 3, 2020 in the case for invalidation of an arbitration award.

First: The operative part of the ruling
“The court ruled to invalidate the contested arbitration award issued in Egypt (Cairo) on 3/22/2013 and obligated the defendant company to pay judicial expenses and an amount of one hundred pounds as compensation for attorney’s fees.”
Second: The facts
The facts from the aforementioned judgment records are that the State of Libya contracted on 6/8/2006 with the Kuwaiti company - Muhammad Abdul Mohsen Al-Kharafi - to establish a tourism investment project in the Tajoura area in Tripoli, in accordance with the Libyan law regarding the encouragement of foreign capital, in the amount of 120 million US dollars, which the company alone will finance, and the period of its use and operation will be ninety years, provided that the state commits to Libya handed over to the company the project land free of all concerns, and ensured that it was free of material and legal obstacles preventing implementation. The state proposed to the company an alternative land for implementation, but it refused, clinging to the contracted land.
After the meetings and correspondence in which the two parties did not reach a solution to the dilemma, the Libyan Minister of Economy issued a decision to cancel the prior license granted to the company to invest and revoke it under the pretext of its laxity in fulfilling its contractual obligations. The company objected to it on the grounds that the breach of contractual obligation was on the part of the Libyan side in accordance with the provisions of the contract and international agreements related to Arab and foreign investment in force in Libya.
Since the contract included an arbitration clause, the company took the initiative to file an arbitration lawsuit against the State of Libya before the Cairo Regional Center for Commercial Arbitration, known as (C R C I C A) in accordance with the provisions of the Unified Agreement for the Investment of Arab Capital in Arab Countries in 1980.
The arbitration panel, composed of three members, considered the case on the basis of applying Libyan laws to the subject of the dispute, including the Foreign Capital Law and its amendments, and that the procedures are conducted in accordance with the procedural rules in force in the aforementioned center.
On 3/22/2013, the arbitration ruling was issued by a majority of the Authority’s members - which is the nullity of the ruling that is the subject of the comment above - obligating the State of Libya to pay the company the following amounts:
“30 million dollars in compensation for moral damages, 5 million dollars in the value of losses and expenses (incurred), 900 million dollars in compensation for lost profits, and 940 thousand dollars in arbitration fees and expenses, meaning a total of nine hundred and thirty-six million nine hundred and forty thousand US dollars, in addition to interest at the rate of 4% on the total amounts awarded...”
The arbitral tribunal decided at the conclusion of its ruling that: “A final decision with expedited implementation, effective on its basis, issued by a majority of votes, and not subject to review.”
The Libyan side filed a lawsuit before the Cairo Court of Appeal to invalidate the aforementioned arbitration award, which ruled on 2/5/2014 not to accept the lawsuit based on its statement: “The arbitration award is based on the understanding and basis of the first overturned award issued on 2/5/2014 referred to,” stating that “as long as the arbitration case took place under the provisions of the Unified Convention, its ruling will be immune before the local judiciary of each of the Convention countries, even if there is a claim of invalidation.” Its principle... is that the original claim for the invalidation of the arbitration awards is, in one way or another, a dispute arising from the application of the agreement, which exclusively designates the Arab Investment Court as a judicial body for disputes arising directly from the agreement itself, and that this investment court affiliated with the League of Arab States is an independent international regional court disconnected from the national procedural systems, including every national arbitration system, and in this way, the invalidation claim falls outside the jurisdiction of the Egyptian judiciary and the scope of its international jurisdiction.”
For the second time, the Libyan side took the path of cassation, so the court ruled on 10/12/2019 to completely overturn the aforementioned ruling, affirming the jurisdiction of the Cairo Court of Appeal to consider the claim for invalidation of the arbitration award in question without other courts, referring the case to it for consideration again by another body, and stating that it is not possible for it to decide on the merits of the invalidation claim, given that the Court of Appeal did not decide on its merits until it has exhausted itself. Its jurisdiction therein, its first overturned ruling was based on lack of acceptance, and its second overturned ruling was also based on lack of jurisdiction.
The Cairo Court of Appeal, in a new body, ruled for the third time on 6/3/2020 to invalidate the arbitration award that is the subject of the case, and this judicial ruling is the subject of the present comment.
Third: Comment
We hasten to say that the court issuing the ruling in question was very cautious and fully aware of what might be interpreted as its approach in dealing with the invalidation of the arbitration award by some who interpreted it as an incorrect doctrine, so it submitted to its judiciary explaining its approach by saying:
“The claim for the invalidity of the arbitration awards that is being heard before the court does not entitle it to comment on the result it reached or to comment on its errors related to defects in assessment regarding the elements of reality or violation of the law. Likewise, the opponents may not re-argue the elements of the substantive dispute or re-present them again before the court of invalidation for review, and the court does not have the right to correct or complete the results proven by the ruling, or restore matters to their proper place, or establish or correct what is in the court.” The arbitration ruling is distorted, but the system or the method of arbitration is one of the universal arbitration frameworks and the principled (justice) rules that are required by common sense and imposed by the facts of things, which prevent it from being used in a way that deviates from its function and its legitimate logical limits. Arbitration is a legal system, not an absolute system. Therefore, if the arbitration award exceeds the established arbitration controls and its essential frameworks or disrupts them, then the award is not entitled to the protection prescribed for it, and therefore it is not allowed to be immune Or to neglect fundamental principles of justice, or to degrade the behavioral guarantees and duties that must be maintained, or to invent something from nothing....”
Moreover, the court also indicated in its ruling notes that the arbitral tribunal had neglected to estimate compensation on the basis of missing the opportunity to gain that it could have made.
The court concluded that the arbitration award was invalidated based on the public order rules that it violated, ranking the results it saw in particular.
Therefore, we will first present: the validity of the court’s reliance on the rules of public order to address and invalidate the arbitration award. Secondly: the validity of what it concluded based on the rules of public order. Third: The extent to which the arbitral tribunal can estimate compensation based on the loss of the opportunity to gain that the court referred to, as follows:
1 - The extent to which it is appropriate for the court to rely on the rules of public order to decide on the invalidation of the arbitration award.
The court based its ruling to invalidate the arbitration award on the basis that it violated “the rules of public order established in the Egyptian judiciary with certain and established principles, as the arbitrator cannot enjoy complete and absolute authority that has no restrictions on it and cannot be protected from its unruliness or deviation within the scope of the consequences and implications of the rules of public order: its orders, prohibitions, and modern standards, the truth of which has been established...”
These reports from the court are not outside what is established in jurisprudence and jurisprudence regarding the rules of public order, because public order is a term that is difficult to limit to a comprehensive and comprehensive definition, and this is what led various international legislations to not set a definition for it, leaving it to judicial jurisprudence to determine the legal rules that it considers to be part of public order. For example, the Libyan Supreme Court defined it as: “the sum of the basic interests on which the entity of society is based, whether political, social, economic, or moral.”[1] The jurist (asman) defined it as:
“Objective rules for the protection of interests, even individual ones, which are essential for the maintenance of the peace and prosperity of the social group in question.”[2]
It is known that the legal rules related to public order are not limited to those that directly concern society and primarily target its highest interests, but rather rules related to the private interests of individuals may be included among them, and they are nevertheless of special importance that rise to the point of considering them in part related to the public interest, such that every violation of them amounts to an assault on the public interest of society. For example, the Beirut Court of Appeal ruled that “it is permissible for the principal to remove the agent from the public order, and it is not permissible to agree on anything that contradicts it.” The principal can dismiss the agent before the work is completed, and it is not permissible for him to stipulate that he receive compensation if the principal dismisses him, because that would restrict the principal’s freedom to dismiss the agent.”[3]
The Jordanian Court of Cassation imposed judicial oversight on the arbitration award if it violated the rules of public order, stating that “the oversight stipulated in Article 49 of the Jordanian Arbitration Law has a formal form such that it does not penetrate to the root of the dispute and the court does not impose oversight on how the arbitration panel interprets the law and how it applies, except that this is conditional on there not being a violation of the rules of public order.”[4]
Accordingly, the extent of the validity of using public order rules as a reason to invalidate an arbitration award ultimately depends on the broad discretionary powers that the courts enjoy when defining and interpreting these rules and determining the scope of their application, according to the circumstances of each case.
With reference to the commented ruling of the Court of Appeal, we find that it exercised its discretion regarding the interpretation of the rules of public order and applied them to the arbitration award presented to it, so it invalidated it for violating these rules with its severe exaggeration in estimating the compensation awarded, as we will see later, which finds its legal basis, as the court stated, from the second paragraph of Article 52 of Egyptian Law No. 27 of 1994 regarding international commercial arbitration regarding violations of public order in Egypt. Thus, the court has not deviated from the correct path in this regard.
2 - The extent of the validity of the court’s findings based on the application of public order rules to the arbitration award.
As a result of the court’s application of the public order rules to the arbitration award as mentioned above, the amounts of compensation awarded by the arbitration panel by a majority of its members appeared to be extremely unfair to the Libyan side, and exceeded the limit of reasonable perception, so it described the arbitration award:
“By violating the legal rule that compensation is proportionate to the damage measured by objective standards or foundations that take into account the actual circumstances of the situation, and this is an established rule of the legitimate rules of public order that cannot be neglected due to its close connection to the interests and rights of individuals and respect for their legitimate expectations, and within the framework of balancing interests of all kinds and not conflicting in its meaning with the requirements of justice and the spirit of fairness... Article Nine of the Unified Convention stipulates To invest Arab capital (that the compensation due to the Arab investor be fair compensation commensurate with the damage)...”
Therefore, we will present, first, the extent to which the reasons for the court’s ruling regarding the arbitral award’s extreme exaggeration in estimating the value of compensation agree with the legal texts and judicial rulings, and secondly: the extent to which there are international judicial precedents regarding judicial oversight of arbitration awards that overestimate the value of compensation, as follows:
A - The extent to which the reasons for the ruling regarding the arbitral award’s extreme exaggeration in estimating compensation agree with the legal texts and judicial rulings.
It is recognized that the fairness of compensation is one of the constitutional principles, and it is an inevitable result of the principle of respect for the rights of individuals, and it is due to the logic of civil responsibility, the essence of which is the necessity of restoring the balance that collapsed due to the damage in general and to the extent possible, and to the restriction that compensation may not be a source of enrichment at the expense of others without reason. The Egyptian Court of Cassation has frequently ruled that: “If the estimation of compensation is one of the issues of fact in which the judge of the matter is independent, the basis for that should be this.” The assessment is based on a reasonable basis, based on its elements established in the papers and its justifications, by which the basis of compensation is balanced with the reason for its imposition, such that it appears to be equivalent to the damage, not less than it, and not in excess of it.[5]
This judiciary agrees, for example, with what is established in the judiciary of the Libyan Supreme Court.[6] Therefore, when the court decided that the compensation awarded by the arbitration award was severely exaggerated, beyond imagination, and disproportionate to the damage that befell the company, its ruling agreed with the law in general and the settled judicial rulings in this regard.
B - The extent of the existence of international judicial precedents regarding judicial oversight of arbitration rulings that overestimate compensation.
The Egyptian judiciary has previously issued several international judicial rulings in which the courts extended their oversight over arbitration rulings, whether explicitly or implicitly, regarding the estimate of excessive compensation. We present some of them as examples, which are:
1. During the year 2011, the Supreme Commercial Court of the Russian Federation issued a ruling on an appeal against a decision granting the executive version of a foreign arbitration award, in which the court considered it to be under the supervision of the enforcement judge to assess the extent of his respect for the principle of proportionality PRiNCiPE OF PROPORTIONALiTY
which is one of the rules of public order, such that he (the enforcement judge) may refuse to grant the executive formula if the arbitration award awards unfair compensation that grossly exceeds the damage.[7]
2. One year before the ruling mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Romanian player (Adrian Mutu) filed an appeal before the Swiss Federal Court against the English club (Chelsea), requesting the annulment of the arbitration ruling issued against him obliging him to compensate the aforementioned club with a sum of money exceeding 17 million dollars on the basis that this amount is exaggerated based on the principle of property protection stipulated in the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, which entails preventing the random confiscation of people’s property, given that the protection of property is considered in the view of the player. It is one of the values that all legal systems must respect, he said, but the court rejected the appeal not because the issue was outside the control of the annulment judge, but rather because the loss was not present in the value of the compensation awarded, based on the correctness of the calculation process conducted by the arbitration panel.[8]
3. The Tunisian Court of Appeal ruled on 5/4/1999 in Case No. 40 to invalidate the arbitration award before it due to the inclusion of an ambiguous phrase that is not suitable for explaining the award, stating that the arbitration panel is required to explain its ruling for four purposes, including verifying that the award actually respected the principle of fairness, which may indicate that there is no injustice to the rights of the person concerned.[9]
Accordingly, the Egyptian judiciary is not innovative in its response and monitoring of the arbitration award regarding its estimation of excessive compensation, but it was preceded by an international judiciary in doing so as mentioned.
3. The extent to which compensation can be based on the earning opportunity
The court stated in its ruling that the arbitration award overlooked “what is known as compensation for missing the opportunity to earn, benefit, or profit, which in reality is compensation for future material damage, and there is nothing preventing it from being considered and calculated as an element of the compensation awarded.”
Does this statement have a basis in the Egyptian cassation judiciary?
We say: Yes, as the Egyptian Court of Cassation ruled in one of its rulings by saying: “It is established in the jurisprudence of this court that if the opportunity is a possible matter, then missing it is inevitable, allowing the injured person to demand compensation for it. The law does not prevent the inclusion in the elements of compensation for the gain that the injured person had hoped to obtain from the realization of this opportunity, but that is conditional on this principle being based on acceptable reasons that, according to the natural course of things, would give preference to Earnings that cost him the wrongful, illegal work...”[10] This is also the established matter in the Libyan judiciary.[11]
From all of the above, we conclude by saying that the ruling of the Cairo Court of Appeal under comment, in our opinion, was not incorrect in what it ruled.
[1] Two administrative appeals No. 19/8 Q and 44/8 Q - dated 19. 12. 1964 Supreme Court Journal - Year 21, Issue 3 - Page 28.
[2] PLANiOL ET G. RiPERT – TRAiTE. PRATIQUE DE DROiL CiViL FRANCAIS – Vi – PAR P.ESMAiN – ED-P: 266 – CiTE PAR PH. MALVARiE - P: 261.
[3] Its Resolution No. 319 dated 21. 3. 1996 - It was mentioned in an article entitled: Public order in judicial jurisprudence - published on the (opinion) page ALRAI.COM Internet.
[4] Its Resolution No. 201/2006 - dated 11. 8. 2006 - Reported by lawyer Mona Khatera - International Arbitration Magazine - Issue 15 - July 2012 - p. 4.
[5] Civil cassation in Appeal No. Civil cassation in Appeal No. 307 of 58 BC - Session 25. 12. 1994 - Technical Office Collection - Year 45 - p. 1650. paragraph . 1.
[6] Civil Appeals No. 210/46 Q-T 8. 3. 2004 Collection of Supreme Court Rulings - Civil Judiciary 2004, Part 2, pp. 610 and 632/50, Q.C. 26. 2. 2006 unpublished and 491/56 BC – T 16. 1. 2012 unpublished.
[7] Mr. Ahmed Al-Rafi, research entitled (Arbitral ruling awarding unfair compensation and monitoring public order) - International Arbitration Journal - No. 16 - p. 203.
[8] Previous reference - p. 206.
[9] Previous reference on the same page.
[10] Civil Appeal No. 1300/63, TC 10. 11. 1994 - Technical Office 45 C 2d 257 p. 1363. Civil Appeal No. 13871/82, PT 5. 4. 2018 - taken from the internet C. C GOR EG 2020.
[11] Civil Appeal No. 134/51, Section 6. 2. 2007 - Collection of Supreme Court Rulings - Civil Judiciary 2007 - Part 1 - p. 339. Civil Appeal No. 300/56, T. 9. 2. 2012 unpublished.
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