Public law & citizenship
Legislative shortcomings in certain Libyan laws
A critical reading of certain Libyan laws and the issues revealed by their practical application.

This paper brings together several legal opinions I worked on over the past decade, either to provide legal advice or to give technical legal support to a public body, with the aim of creating a fair investment environment in Libya in which businesses have equal opportunities, without state institutions dominating and monopolizing the economic scene. I shall therefore address legislative shortcomings through a brief review of several laws whose provisions, in my view, sometimes conflict with a correct understanding of the law and, worse, with their own legislative purpose of serving the state's economic strategies, looking ahead to the importance of Libya becoming a commercial and financial center not only for North Africa but for the entire African continent.
First: Law No. (23) of 2010 on Commercial Activity
Leaving aside the methodological defect of this law currently in force—its omission of an organizational index for provisions exceeding 1300 articles—my concern here is the substantive aspect: highlighting the principal legal objections, some of which can be discussed as legislative or interpretive shortcomings in applying the law, while recognizing the many positive features it introduced, as follows:
- Rather than settling the traditional doctrinal distinction between civil and commercial companies in favor of the latter, the legislature failed to follow legal practice in many advanced legal systems, which have brought the different types together under the single designation “companies” and treat them all on a commercial basis. Indeed, since 1985 these countries, including France—the source of Libya's Civil Code through Egypt—have adopted an advanced definition of the nature and meaning of a company: not a contract between two or more parties, but an economic undertaking seeking profit and bearing losses. This legislative modernization opened the way to adopting the new form known as the single-person company, a direction Libyan law has not taken.
- The law links a company's business operations to the amount of its capital, which must be proportionate to the volume of business as specified by a Cabinet decision (Article 14). International practice does not really follow this approach, relying instead on other mechanisms concerning trust, solvency, monitoring and proper performance. A company requires only three main conditions for its existence and operation: 1- Registration in a commercial register that is genuinely accessible to everyone through a website, with continuous updating to protect customers' rights and interests. 2- A tax file based on objective criteria to protect the state's rights. 3- A fixed company address to protect third parties.
- Article (16) expressly provides that company capital is determined by the founders unless the legislature specifies it by law or delegates this competence to the Cabinet or Minister of Economy. The requirement in Minister of Economy Decision No. (207) of 2012 on foreign participation in companies and on branches and representative offices of foreign companies in Libya, as amended, fixing joint-company capital at no less than one million Libyan dinars (Article 2), appears contrary to that provision. Worse, the “joint company” form, introduced into the Libyan legal system by Cabinet Decision No. (171) of 2006 as a vehicle for a partnership between foreigners and Libyans, no longer exists among the company types recognized by the law. It is therefore implicitly abolished by Article (375) of the same law, which allows foreigners, whether legal persons or individuals, to establish or join with Libyans, whether legal persons or individuals, all company types provided for by law, unless an express provision prohibits foreign participation and reserves them exclusively for Libyans. An example is Article (317), requiring Libyan nationality to establish or become a partner in a “tasharukiya” as a civil company. A future practical study should consider whether this company type—a partnership with a civil rather than commercial character—should continue to exist. This approach would be unnecessary if the legislature chose international practice by recognizing only clearly differentiated types of commercial companies through a unified Companies Act. The Minister of Economy's initiative as the competent authority under the decision—retaining the joint company—contradicts the legislative purpose itself and amounts to a possible legal violation which, in my opinion, the Law Department of the Supreme Judicial Council could resolve. In other words, the statutory requirement to state a partner's nationality in the constitutional documents of a partnership, or a shareholder's nationality in a joint-stock company, is no legislative redundancy. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the purpose of the 2010 law was to stimulate the private sector, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, which actually need small amounts of capital to enter partnerships with foreigners. That differs from the rules governing the “joint company,” whose minimum founding capital the Minister of Economy set at one million Libyan dinars, in practice obstructing business development and growth and, moreover, expressly contradicting Article (15) and implicitly Article (375) of the same law.
- In Article (99), the legislature left the Cabinet to set the ceiling or percentage of shareholders' participation, whether legal or natural persons, in joint-stock companies. On the Minister of Economy's proposal, the Cabinet continued the approach followed before 2011 through Decision No. 186/2012 on certain provisions concerning joint-stock companies. It retained a minimum capital of one hundred thousand Libyan dinars without setting a percentage or ownership ceiling for legal persons (companies). At the same time, however, it neither abolished nor amended the existing restriction on ownership by natural persons (individuals), retaining a maximum of 10% of company capital per individual. This accords neither with international commercial practice nor even with Libyan legislation before 1977. This legacy must be removed because it obstructs private-sector growth; individuals should have greater scope to own and dispose of their private assets without circumventing legislation through fictitious or inactive shareholders.
- Another positive feature of the law is that it abolished the supervisory body and allows a general manager to replace the board of directors in limited liability companies whose capital is below one hundred thousand Libyan dinars. It also permits their establishment with small capital of at least three thousand Libyan dinars and a minimum of two founders. It took a similar approach to banks as joint-stock companies in Article (196), allowing a bank's articles of association to replace the supervisory body with another form of supervision. In other words, commercial banks in Libya may propose a supervisory system replacing the supervisory committee; one suggestion is to appoint a representative of the Central Bank of Libya or of an independent body, such as financial authorities, if these are established in Libya in future by legislation such as a Financial Services Act.
- Libya lacks a Financial Services Act establishing an independent regulator to supervise financial and investment bodies, as is customary elsewhere. Such a law would regulate relations between users of financial and investment services, particularly natural persons, and providers such as banks, investment funds, finance-leasing companies and similar entities, as well as public bodies including the Central Bank of Libya, the stock exchange, the Ministry of Economy and others. The regulator would supervise these bodies without undertaking commercial, profit-making or self-interested activity. This is partly reflected in the creation of the General Authority for Supervision and Oversight of Non-Banking Financial Markets and Instruments under Article (2) of Law No. 11 of 2010 on the Libyan Capital Market, and its regulation under Article (395) of the Commercial Law. The objection is its attachment to the Ministry of Economy, which deprives it of a degree of independence and professional neutrality as a business regulator. This is particularly so given overlapping and conflicting interests in the responsibilities of the Central Bank, stock exchange and Ministry of Economy concerning practical matters involving investment funds and finance-leasing companies after Law No. 46 of 2012 amended Banking Law No. 1 of 2005. In practice, this produced a joint committee of those bodies tasked with coordinating authorizations and the establishment and registration of these investment and commercial instruments. This situation does not accord with a correct understanding of the law, international practice or even the Basel accords themselves.
- A new provision of this law, which most or all joint-stock companies—especially state companies and particularly investment companies—have not observed in practice, concerns a joint-stock company owning more than 50% of any company: it must change its legal form from a joint-stock company to a holding company (Article 249). The legal consequence of failing to implement this provision may be that the joint-stock company with limited liability loses the legal protection granted to shareholders, whereby they bear financial obligations only to the extent of their shareholding. Their liability may instead extend to their other property, that is, to all their assets outside the company.
- Another development introduced by Article (256) is the reclassification of public joint-stock companies: a company is considered “public” if all its capital is owned by one or more public legal persons, meaning the state in the form solely of ministries, institutions, authorities, agencies and public services, taking account of Article (11) of the same law. In my view this rule does not extend to state companies, pursuant to Article (87) of the Civil Code as amended by Law No. 138 of 1970 and the principle established by the Libyan Supreme Court on 23/2/1987. Thus, if there is ownership or participation by a private legal person—a company partly or wholly owned by the state, private companies or individuals—even at a level below 1%, the company loses its legal classification as “public.” It consequently loses the legal protections accorded to public-domain property against seizure, acquisition of ownership, prescription or disposal.... This is a positive legislative development toward a fairer basis for competition in the Libyan market, compared with the position before 2010, including Public-Sector Companies Law No. 3/2007.
- Another positive addition is that the law introduced, for the first time, a further business instrument called “investment funds.” These still lack much legislative regulation because implementing regulations have not been issued, except those issued by the Central Bank of Libya under Law No. 46 of 2012—with my reservations about a central bank performing this role. Moreover, those regulations do not comprehensively cover the various dimensions and matters relating to investment funds. In this context I recall being asked in 2009 to prepare and draft a decision establishing a twenty-billion-dollar joint investment fund between the Libyan Investment Authority and the Central Bank of Libya. I named it the Libyan Investment and Development Fund, now called the Libyan Internal Investment and Development Fund. The Authority's other arms were prohibited from undertaking commercial or investment activities inside Libya, and this fund was allowed as an exception, despite the approach conflicting with IMF and World Bank recommendations that the Authority avoid competing with the private sector through investment inside Libya, in order to create a competitive business environment. The principal reservation I raised at a face-to-face meeting at the Central Bank's headquarters to discuss the draft establishment decision was that Libya's legislative system had not then adopted the form of “funds,” “investment funds” or even “portfolios.” Names such as the Libya Africa Investment Portfolio or the Long-Term Portfolio were merely designations, not a legal characterization as a joint-stock company, holding company, public institution or agency. What caught my attention was that neither the Libya Africa Investment Portfolio nor the Long-Term Portfolio fell within those legal categories: neither was a company, agency or institution. Legally, this has the adverse consequence of exposing the Libyan state, embodied in the owning Libyan Investment Authority, to liability for financial acts performed by these entities, which lack legal personality and are closest in legal classification to “de facto companies.” I also advised the Authority that the legal status of its portfolios must be addressed, because they are in reality merely “pools of assets” without legal personality: either place their assets in a department directly subordinate to the Authority or register them as commercial companies. The Libya Africa Investment Portfolio did this, whereas the Long-Term Portfolio, managing assets with a market value of around 8 billion US dollars, remains in the same situation. The soundness of this interpretation is reinforced by its inability to act outside Libya as a legal person except through the Libyan Foreign Investment Company. This was avoided when the Libyan Internal Investment and Development Fund was established by Cabinet Decision No. (107) of 2009, being constituted from the outset as a holding company, regardless of its assigned or commonly used name.
- Although the law positively limits control and dominance by commercial instruments over the market and the creation of economic groupings for monopolistic purposes to no more than 30% of the relevant activity's share within the Libyan market under Articles (1287) and (1289), the Ministry of Economy, as the competent authority, has not yet activated these provisions through operational mechanisms, including establishment of the Competition Council itself (Article 1292).
- The legislature would have done better to regulate bankruptcy, intellectual property, commercial arbitration and consumer protection through separate laws adopting international practice in greater depth, rather than a limited number of articles in this law. The same applies to the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, which should be treated as a civil association or professional union outside state supervision or control, except for financial oversight by the Audit Bureau. Moreover, membership should be voluntary, not compulsory (Articles 1332 and 1331), to encourage such unions or civic associations to attract members through the quality of their services.
- It is worth drawing attention here to Article (25) of Law No. (3) of 2014 on the Legal Profession, requiring every foreign company operating in Libya, before commencing any activity, to engage a Libyan lawyer qualified to plead at least before courts of appeal. This requirement applies throughout the company's activity in Libya. It may reflect the same legislative approach that requires companies generally, not only foreign companies, to appoint an external auditor under Article (18) of the Commercial Law. However, the Ministry of Economy has not yet implemented the provision of Article (3) referred to above, although it imposes a legal obligation on foreign companies and an additional financial burden, while providing technical and financial support for the legal profession
in Libya.
- Article (175) prohibits any person from holding more than three board memberships in joint-stock companies. The wording implies that this restriction does not apply to other company types. My concern here, however, is the need to apply good-governance rules, rather than merely observe the provision itself. Noncompliance carries legal risks: it may open the way to challenges to board decisions whose adoption depended on the vote of a director appointed contrary to that article because they hold more than three board memberships in joint-stock companies. Moreover, failing to apply governance rules preventing employees of public institutions, services and companies—especially directors, general managers and employees such as heads of departments—from sitting on the boards of their subsidiaries or owned companies exposes all the owning bodies' assets to risk and deprives them of legal protection as shareholders. This is the loss of the benefit known as the Corporate Veil. It should be eliminated particularly in public companies, specifically state companies and investment companies, because foreign courts regard it as a factor depriving a board of independent decision-making through the owning entity's, namely the state's, influence over company policies and directions. State dominance through the appointment of its employees, whatever their grade or position, together with tax exemptions enjoyed by some public companies, can make a company's failure to fulfill a financial obligation a liability potentially borne by the Libyan state as a whole. It then becomes difficult to invoke immunity or legal independence as a public legal person separate from the state, particularly in Anglo-Saxon Common Law systems. Libya's past success in cases against foreign parties, such as keeping state assets separate from those of investment companies or the National Oil Corporation and preventing seizure of their assets abroad, does not mean this situation will continue: foreign parties and courts have begun examining these matters closely.
To avoid this, we should adopt the successful Norwegian experience of making state companies leading competitors both domestically and internationally, through several incentives, foremost among them prohibiting by legislation every public employee, regardless of grade, from holding a position on the board of a public company . The revenue figures of Norwegian companies, industries and services, and its sovereign fund approaching one trillion US dollars, reflect this success and embody the legal protection that is a central feature: we do not see litigation against them as we do with Libyan state companies and institutions.
To conclude this discussion, I would mention my continuing exchanges with the Minister of Economy, Mr. Ahmed Al-Koshli, seeking to persuade him of the need to send a positive message to national and foreign investors and companies, either by enacting legislation improving the business environment or by preserving existing legal situations and positions while promoting small and medium-sized enterprises. These discussions culminated in Decision No. (103) of 2012, issued on 13 May that year. Barely a month or so after its issuance, it was replaced by Decision No. (207) of 2012, issued on 5 June that year, under unprofessional pressures. This sent a very negative message to foreign companies and encouraged them to rely more strongly on force majeure as a reason not to return to work in Libya. The decision required them to regularize their position within six months—as usual, rather than years—notably by reducing their participation in joint companies from 65% to 49% and retroactively , requiring the chairman of the board to be Libyan, and making the decision effective from its date of issuance, without even waiting for publication . Although Decision No. 22 of 2012 partly reduced these negative effects, they continue to weigh heavily on trust between foreign companies and the Libyan state, including the expansion of activities and fields prohibited to foreigners from 3 activities to more than 14 at present. There had also been a provision in the regulations governing commercial and investment activities—omitted from the decisions issued—requiring the Ministry of Economy to approve, or issue a reasoned refusal of, an application to establish a commercial company or investment project within a maximum of 15 days . In the absence of a response based on professional grounds, the company or investment project would, by operation of law, be deemed established, all with the aim of combating corruption and bureaucracy .
Second: Law No. (9) of 2010 on Investment Promotion
- Perhaps the main criticism of this law is its setting the required capital threshold for an investment project at five million Libyan dinars for foreigners and two million Libyan dinars for projects involving Libyans and foreigners. This means that it did not take account of the importance of promoting small and medium-sized enterprises. Article (8) also left the Cabinet to determine production and service fields, foreign participation percentages, legal forms and minimum capital. Implementing Regulation No. 499 of 2010 then took a legislative approach favoring openness without specifying fields, percentages or legal forms. It went a further positive step by resolving, through a practical legal interpretation, the dispute introduced by the law over the link between the commercial register and the investment register.
- Neither the Investment Law nor its implementing regulation established practical mechanisms governing investors' contributions to an investment project through intellectual property rights as contributions in kind, whether for their financial valuation or for determining their legal requirements.
Third: Law No. (46) of 2012 on Banks and the Addition of a Chapter on Islamic Banking
- Under the amending law, Article (16), as amended, empowered the Central Bank of Libya, governed by Banking Law No. (1) of 2005, to authorize the establishment of finance-leasing companies and investment funds; set rules for their activities and model constitutional documents and articles of association; grant and revoke operating licenses; and regulate maximum real-estate financing limits (Article 56, as amended). This takes the Central Bank away from its role as an independent body accountable to the legislative authority, managing state reserves and regulating monetary and credit policy, and turns it into an executive body under the government on the same level as the Ministry of Economy and the Libyan Capital Market. It has caused a legal difficulty between these bodies, as discussed earlier in this paper, and naturally does not accord with international practice, in addition to conflicting with the Basel accords themselves.
- Article (77/3) of the Banking Law prohibits commercial banks from owning shares in other joint-stock companies exceeding (10%) in value. This implies that the prohibition does not apply to other company forms, since the default rule permits ownership above 10% unless an official interpretation by the Law Department of the Supreme Judicial Council provides otherwise.
Fourth: Law No. (13) of 1980 on Social Security and Its Amendments
One practical issue attracting attention is the statutory monopoly granted over this sector to an investment fund such as the Social Security Fund. Moreover, the law requires employees and workers in all sectors of the Libyan state to pay social-security contributions (Article 9), otherwise exposing them to financial and cumulative penalties similar to the tax system, although the Fund is not a tax authority but an independent body—an investment fund. It goes further by requiring contributions from persons not resident in Libya, whether under nationality law itself or in fact, such as directors of private and joint companies, in return for approval to complete their registration in Libya. In other words, every country, including Libya, needs social services; no one disputes their importance, necessity or quality. In Libya these are embodied in the Solidarity Fund for needy families and people on limited incomes. But an employee, worker or person pursuing a professional or commercial activity is legally required to contribute to an investment fund from which they may not benefit in future, or they may prefer to pay into another pension fund or funds or in another country. Why impose this unjustified obligation, contrary to the model recognized in international practice? Worse, it is imposed on foreigners who may never benefit from the contributions paid if no reciprocal social-security benefits agreement exists with their countries. Another especially surprising aspect is the Fund's continued use of an entirely unfair pension formula based on the overall average of continuous income during the final three uninterrupted years of work, including salary and all financial benefits, such as board memberships, working committees and others. This truly creates inequality and social injustice, with enormous pension differences between comparable people and jobs. For example, two people graduated at the same time with the same academic or professional qualification and worked together in the same body. One was elected to the General National Congress or House of Representatives and, after three years or more, ended up with a pension of twenty or thirty thousand Libyan dinars. The colleague who was not fortunate enough to stand for election, or for other reasons, receives a pension of no more than one or two thousand dinars. This creates resentment, social disparity and different living standards within the middle classes because the pension system is unfair to many of them. Viewed another way, suppose I was a minister, chairman of a public company's board or ambassador, with income including benefits exceeding ten thousand dinars monthly. For health reasons, the end of my appointment or otherwise, I returned to my former ordinary salaried job for three years or more, then reached retirement age with a pension of around one or two thousand Libyan dinars. Is it fair that my average pensionable salary is calculated on the basis of one or two thousand dinars rather than ten thousand, meaning that, in addition to taxes, I paid social-security contributions on 8000 to 9000 Libyan dinars from which I will never benefit in my future pension?
The same mechanism—the formula averaging income over the last three years—was used in Britain 35 years ago. Because it was unfair, it was replaced by a formula averaging income over the period of work or employment for which contributions had been paid into an investment pension fund, divided by time on a monthly basis. The retiree thus receives a pension corresponding to actual income, encouraging individuals to invest part of their monthly earnings in pension funds during working life, avoid early retirement and increase contributions to obtain a larger pension. This may explain the older generation's insistence on retaining leadership posts in Libya, and perhaps the unspoken, hidden reason for competition over senior positions in state institutions, particularly abroad, without the required experience or competence. The situation is worsened because most of those in senior state and institutional positions are over sixty or seventy, reducing or eliminating their willingness and ability to take initiative and decisive, transformative administrative decisions to develop and modernize public institutions and companies. Their principal ambition is a high pension in the final years of employment, with the professional favors this entails at the expense of professionalism, under the pretext of deliberation and experience in managing such institutions. It is relevant here that retirement age under Libyan Labor Relations Law No. (12) of 2010 was raised from 65 to 70, perhaps for political rather than professional reasons: the leadership cadres of “Libya Tomorrow” were not then ready, and necessity required retaining existing personnel until new cadres were prepared.
We therefore truly need to reconsider the nature and structure of the social-security system as a whole in line with international experience. In my view, the Social Security Fund must prepare over the coming years for competition and an open market, because there is a very strong possibility of its losing the benefit of state protection in the Libyan market, like comparable funds. It should also move early beyond the legislative constraint in practice by seeking conservative, limited-risk investments outside Libya. Finally, it should seek to recover a large part of the Libyan state's debts to it and reinvest them through a carefully studied scientific approach and international expertise, diversifying across asset classes.
Fifth: Law No. (36) of 2012 on the Administration of the Funds and Property of Certain Persons, as Amended by Law No. (47) of the Same Year
While advising a foreign group on financing a huge stalled project in Tripoli worth hundreds of millions of dollars, this law caught my attention because the person appointed to lead the Libyan body appeared in its listed names. Articles (6, 7, 8 and 9) in particular raised the question of that person's entitlement to dispose of public funds through contracts or lending. There is a legislative gap: the person subject to sequestration is prevented from disposing of their own assets and those of their children and wives, while others are prohibited from dealing with them or notarizing such acts, but the prohibition does not extend —as a matter of law— to disposal of assets belonging to the state or public or private bodies and companies if that person is appointed to manage them, without a ceiling other than that imposed by the body's internal regulations, the state's financial law or the Audit Bureau's statutory powers. Dealing with that person thus remains a matter of propriety or ethics, not legality.
I drew this legal gap to the attention of a member of the General National Congress's legislative committee in 2013 to overcome the difficulty, but to no avail.
Sixth: Law No. (1) 2013 of 2013 Prohibiting Usury
No one disputes the prohibition of usury, although it has been defined only in its religious dimension without specifying its religious-economic nature. Nor does anyone oppose a law prohibiting it. But the dispute clearly concerns the ability to apply the law, considering the human resources and practical capacities currently available in Libya to implement it, and the stages needed for future scientific and economic implementation, which the law omitted. Instead, it took effect immediately for transactions by natural persons with legal persons, and after two years (the beginning of 2015) for transactions between legal persons, with retroactive effect.
Banks and companies operating in Libya are not ready to take such action and implement the law within two years. Indeed, Libya's economic system, particularly its banks, cannot carry out this reform within the time allowed, and will therefore incur —and has incurred— unassessed financial losses, particularly as the law was voted on by a show of hands and broadcast live.... The House of Representatives' decision to postpone implementation for another five years, until 2020, does not take effect throughout Libyan territory, given the Central Bank's location in Tripoli and the binding force of the Supreme Court judgment declaring the seventh constitutional amendment unlawful in western and perhaps southern Libya.
Countries such as Malaysia and Bahrain, despite two decades or more of progress in building a foundation for Islamic financial instruments, still use both conventional and Islamic banking systems. Libya, which truly lacks the personnel and financial instruments, has even more reason to adopt that approach.
Seventh: Law No. (11) of 2014 Establishing the National Anti-Corruption Authority
The Authority was first established by Law No. (63) of 2012, later replaced by Law No. (11) of 2014, as a public body accountable to the legislative authority. What again attracts attention —and recently— is the Libyan press's reporting of several Authority decisions suspending public employees for corruption. Returning to the law itself, the Authority has no legal power to take this action except in cases of flagrante delicto, and even then it is confined to certain Authority employees vested with judicial police powers, following the procedures prescribed in Libya's Criminal Procedure Code. Otherwise, the Authority's statutory remit is limited to referring employees suspected of corruption to the Prosecutor General when the conduct amounts to a crime, or to the administrative or financial oversight authority when it is an administrative or financial violation (Article 21). The decisions mentioned are legally nonexistent for usurpation of power. This does not, however, prevent the Authority from carrying out the role assigned to it under Articles (3, 4, 5 and 6) of this law.
Eighth: Law No. (24) of 2001 on Prohibiting the Use of Arabic in All Transactions
The law remains in force despite certain exceptions introduced in 2007 by Cabinet decision for tourism, by the law protecting antiquities, ancient areas and cities and historic buildings, by Libyan Investment Authority Law No. (13) of 2010, and by Law No. (18) of 2013 on the Rights of Cultural and Linguistic Components. Even with the 2011 Constitutional Declaration and its amendments, use of a language other than Arabic, such as English, remains a criminal offense punishable by criminal penalties and fines (Article 4). Clear examples include English on the backdrops, logos and seals of legislative bodies, from the General National Congress to the House of Representatives, and of governments in eastern and western Libya, as well as on shops, cafés and elsewhere. The Cabinet can, however, use its powers under Article (2, paragraph 4) to issue a decision allowing itself and other public and private bodies to use other languages, especially English.
Ninth: Law No. (12) of 2010 on Labor Relations
- The principal objections concern Article (128), specifically paragraphs 1 and 2, which require a person taking a position in the staffing establishments of administrative units under Articles (124, 125 and 126) to hold Libyan nationality and civil rights, as set out in Articles (1) and (5) of Law No. (24) on Nationality Provisions, and not to be married to a foreign woman unless authorized by the competent authority, namely the Ministry of Social Affairs. These provisions apply to a number of past and present holders of leadership posts, including heads of public institutions and bodies, ambassadors and equivalent officials. This constitutes an express breach of the law; decisions they have taken or take in their official capacities consequently harm state interests because they are tainted by invalidity and may amount to legal nonexistence, meaning they do not become immune through expiry of the time limit for administrative judicial challenge. Conversely, third parties may benefit from some of those acts under the de facto official doctrine.
- The law limits full-time secondments and assignments to no more than four years, once only (Articles 147 and 149). Yet some state employees continue working in the bodies to which they are assigned or seconded for more than four years. Their administrative acts, particularly where they have decision-making powers, are thus contrary to law and issued by a person usurping authority, potentially allowing third parties to sue the Libyan state. The same applies to secondments unless the seconded person obtains a Cabinet decision extending the secondment.
Tenth: Law No. (22) of 2010 on Telecommunications
Several legal opinions I provided in recent years, most notably to Google, You Tube and Cisco, showed me that Telecommunications Law No. (6) had not been properly activated because of shortcomings in issuing its implementing regulations. Even the regulatory decisions issued cover only certain procedures and permissions concerning ordinary use of conventional or digital communications. They do not cover rights of use and access to the Libyan market, or require such digital technology companies to open offices or branches in Libya as in most developed countries. Such requirements would bring financial benefits to the state through expenditure or taxes and allow greater legal control over information flows and responsibility for the use of what is called Data. Libya lacks even a law regulating and protecting it—a Data Protection Act, as in other countries. Recent judgments by some European courts imposed large fines on such companies for misuse of and inadequate protection for personal information, including a Belgian court's fine of 100 million euros against Facebook for this breach of individuals' personal-data protection.... These examples support the need to build a strong legal foundation protecting individuals' and the state's interests in Libya. A recent example in this context is the European Union decision on protecting the transfer of personal information, which entered into force on 25/5/2018 and has become the strongest legal line of protection in those countries for information concerning individuals and companies.
Eleventh: Law No. (27) of 2013 Providing for a Wife and Children Allowance
The danger in this law is that it imposes an unconditional obligation—with no escape clauses—on the state to grant and pay these allowances monthly, whatever the economic circumstances. Any citizen with standing and an interest can therefore sue the state under this law for failing to pay the allowance regularly, and may claim compensation for delayed payment if harm is established.
In conclusion, I believe these years have seen a departure from a rights-based approach through failure to respect the application of legislation and, more particularly, judgments issued from time to time by Libyan courts against certain bodies and decision-makers. I wish to emphasize, however, that prescription in criminal matters and negligence concerning public funds is not subject to time limits, and may also benefit from the doctrine of moral impediment in the worst case, while Law No. (3) of 1986 on “Where Did You Get This?” remains in force. In addition, those who think they can shelter abroad should remember that Libya is a party to the 2005 Anti-Corruption Convention—especially its Article Twenty—ratified by Law No. (10) of that same year.
Al-Budairi Shariha
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