Litigation & arbitration
Supreme Court Decision No. 7 of 2016: Legal Comment
Legal commentary on the Resolution of the General Assembly of the Libyan Supreme Court No. 7 of 2016.

On 10/5/2016 AD, the General Assembly of the Supreme Court issued its Decision No. (7) 2016 AD, which was the subject of a circular issued by the Judicial Inspection Department of the Supreme Judicial Council No. (3) 2020 AD, raising the legal problem that practically results from the aforementioned court decision, which is stated in its text as “ postponing the decision on constitutional appeals until a period later determined by a decision of the General Assembly...” Which makes the decision and the circular - in practice - a subject for legal and jurisprudential graduation that may help in addressing this judicial blockage that has entailed the legislative and executive divisions in the State of Libya since the state of institutional division in the authorities, although the Libyan judiciary still maintains its unity throughout the country.
First of all, the beginning of the Libyan Supreme Court dates back to the beginning of the fifties of the last century, where it began and went through a path that is truly praised by judicial positions in preserving the principle of balance of power and protecting constitutional principles from being infringed upon or infringed upon, whether by the executive or even the legislative authority. In this regard, we have several issues that there is no need to delve into, the most important of which is the cancellation of decisions and decrees issued by the government or the king, as well as the cancellation of legislative texts in laws that were not consistent with the correct constitution in place at the time. However, it was removed from its role in considering constitutional issues by Law No. (6) of 1982 reorganizing it, and this jurisdiction was not returned to it except by Law No. (17) of 1994 AD, and although constitutional jurisdiction was assigned to it once again, the court distanced itself from interfering in constitutional issues in order to preserve its reputation under the political system that prevailed at that time and did not resume it. This judicial role took place only in the middle of the last decade (2005 AD), without the need in this regard to delve into the nature of the Libyan constitution and its previous nature. However, shortly after 2011 AD, the court began examining constitutional issues, and its most important position was the abolition of the Fourth and Seventh Amendments to the Constitutional Declaration issued in August 2011, as will be explained later.
Despite the fact that the amendment to the Judicial System Law in 2012 gave it financial independence, an increase in the salaries of members of judicial bodies, and administrative neutrality by separating the affiliation of the Supreme Judicial Council from the Ministry of Justice as an executive authority, the court’s decision, the subject of this comment, raises a legal controversy as to whether this postponement in the eyes of constitutional claims is considered a denial of justice, and who can consider such a decision before it?
Therefore, this comment is addressed in a number of topics as follows:
- Supreme Court ruling in 2014 AD
- Laws and decisions issued by the General National Congress after 2014 AD
- Laws and decisions issued by the House of Representatives
- The Skhirat Agreement and the constitutional amendment
- The principle of denial of justice
- Regional/Continental Court
First: Judgment of the Libyan Supreme Court No. ( 17 ) 61 BC - issued on 11/6/2014 AD
The ruling issued by the Libyan Supreme Court that the Seventh Amendment to the Constitutional Declaration (Article 30, Paragraph 11) was unconstitutional sparked endless political and media controversy, but the court’s legal conclusion - in our opinion - from the beginning remains a sound legal conclusion that the National Conference session was not able to make this amendment because the quorum in attendance did not reach 124 votes, but only 121 votes were present for members, which did not need the court to The merits of the ruling do not address at all the objective aspect, nor the illegal effects that could result from this ruling, since the court adhered to its jurisdiction. On the one hand, and on the other hand, a vote on the ruling from 13 advisors out of 15 is sufficient to issue the ruling, which requires a two-thirds majority, which is nine judges, in the assembled chambers of the court. What increases this confirmation of the soundness of this legal conclusion is that the same judges who ruled to abolish the Fourth Amendment to the Constitutional Declaration are the same ones who ruled to abolish the Seventh Amendment, a situation that confirms that it is not possible to accept media or political claims that question the integrity of the ruling or its issuance in unsafe conditions as long as the court simply contented itself within the limits of the procedural aspects to consider the constitutional lawsuit professionally in terms of whether or not a quorum is available in voting and did not delve into the matter in depth, adhering to the reasons for the appeal. [1]
However, the legal controversy seems to have been settled regarding the invalidity of the results of this amendment, including the outputs of the February Committee and the presence of the House of Representatives itself. However, the question was and still arises, which is whether or not the General National Congress has the right to continue? Because of its connection to a period of time that has existed and ended, and that Libya is in a stage of political and legislative blockage and institutional division from which there is no way out except by holding new elections.
In this context, we may point out that the Supreme Court avoided considering Appeal No. (16), by deciding its belief that there was a procedural basis to rely on in Appeal No. (17) without the need to delve into the subject of the legal dispute once again, and it did well.
Second: Laws and decisions issued by the National Conference after 2014 AD
The General National Congress was elected in valid elections in 2012, which gave it legitimacy as a legislative authority in accordance with the Constitutional Declaration of 2011, to exercise its jurisdiction to issue and amend laws, as well as decisions by decree, until the issuance of the aforementioned Supreme Court ruling. The legal problem arises in the extent of the legitimacy of the General National Congress’ continuation in the presence of the House of Representatives, which was implicitly canceled by the aforementioned Supreme Court ruling? Are those defending its continuation after 2014 and beyond based either on the argument that there is no specific time limit for its continuation, or that the delivery and receipt procedures were not completed by constitutional means for the tasks of the legislative authority in Tripoli, or the fear of a legislative vacuum occurring in the state?
Judges in the Libyan courts appear to be divided over the constitutionality of the laws and amendments issued by the General National Congress in the years 2014 and 2015 AD, and the basis of the disagreement goes back to the failure to resolve the question as to whether or not the continued presence of the General National Congress is constitutional in this period so that it becomes a legitimate authority in carrying out its legislative duty. Regardless of the criterion of time or the argument of legislative vacuum, - in our opinion - the General National Congress may also be considered a closed body, and on the other hand, no one who had the capacity and interest - subsequently - requested an explanation in this part from the Libyan Supreme Court, or a fatwa from the administration of the law, and this is what we have indicated for the necessity of its need in more than one forgetfulness in advance. The legal controversy may come from Article (30) of the Constitutional Declaration, which states: “… The General National Congress shall ratify and announce the results, The legislative authority shall be called to meet within a period not exceeding thirty days . In its first session the General National Congress is dissolved The legislative authority performs its duties.....). Which requires us to stop at this text and implement it if the call to convene this session stipulated in this article is completed. The question then is: Is the conference - constitutionally - considered dissolved, or are the conditions for its dissolution not met? Therefore, what is the argument of those who say that its continuation is constitutional or not due to the deadlines or failure to fulfill the constitutionally stipulated requirements?
Third: Laws and decisions issued by the House of Representatives
The House of Representatives is an elected body that assumes its duties from the General National Congress in 2013 AD. However, the issuance of the Supreme Court’s ruling constitutes - in our view - a major fundamental turning point for the House of Representatives, considering it the legislative authority in the state, to an unconstitutional body - implicitly - which leads to a lack of regard for the legislation it issues, and this is what we find, for example, in Law No. (1) of 2013 AD regarding Preventing usurious transactions (because we have reservations about voting on it and the time rush in a country that does not have the professional and grassroots readiness to make this legislative amendment), which was amended by Law No. (7) of 2015 AD issued by the House of Representatives to freeze the aforementioned Law No. (1) of 2013 for a period of five years until 2020 AD. However, this amended law (No. 7 of 2015) is not being taken into account, as the Supreme Court did not refer to it when it considered Civil Appeal No. 467/64 Q dated 6/16/2019 AD, and it took refuge in Law No. (1) of 2013 AD referred to, and considered it valid without considering Law No. (7) of 2015 which issued its freeze. .
This legislative chaos, which is in addition to the institutional division in the country, finds a fertile ground in the political agreement in Skhirat in Morocco, which added another weight since 2016 to the legislative arena in Libya, as this agreement activated the existing legislative bodies (the General National Congress in the form of the State Council and the House of Representatives as a legislative authority) and the Government of National Accord as an executive authority. However, we face a dilemma. Legality in the extent to which it is considered constitutionally legitimized in the House of Representatives by amending the Constitutional Declaration is consistent with the validity of the Constitutional Declaration issued in 2011.
In this context, we recall Supreme Court Appeal No. 467/64 Q dated 6/16/2019 AD, which reflects the tendency of the Libyan Supreme Court to completely ignore the existence of the House of Representatives, in implicit implementation of its ruling No. 17/61 Q issued on 11/6/2014 AD when it came under the scope of applying Law No. 1/2013 AD regarding blocking transactions. Usury interest in its aforementioned civil appeal completely ignores the existence or enforcement of Law No. 7 of 2015 issued by the House of Representatives amending Law No. 1 of 2013 mentioned above.
Fourth: The Skhirat Agreement and the constitutional amendment
It is still the subject of an unresolved legal controversy despite its international recognition and action - in effect - on its basis. The agreement remains in its political covenant for a period of only two years... The question comes about the extent of the constitutionality of the agreement and its validity after the two years (i.e. at the end of 2019 AD). Perhaps the Libyan Supreme Court, if the matter is presented to it, may see or classify the issue as a sovereign issue and an act of sovereignty, and thus refrain from considering it, and the administration The law did not provide us with an opinion regarding it... So where is the recourse, similar to the court decision to which this comment is the subject?
In this context... the Supreme Court has truly distanced itself from considering acts of sovereignty because they fall outside its jurisdiction, when it overturned the ruling of the Tripoli Court of Appeal (Administrative Circuit) No. 30/1970 dated 3/22/2017 AD regarding the memorandum of understanding signed between the Libyan state and Italy for cooperation in the fields of development and combating illegal immigration, human trafficking and smuggling. And strengthening border security signed on 2/2/2017 AD, because the court exceeded its jurisdiction in accordance with what is established by the Libyan judiciary and the provisions of Law No. 88 of 1971 regarding administrative judiciary, related to the actions carried out by the Government of National Accord or not (Administrative Appeal No. 151/64 Q dated 6/26/2019 AD).
What is worth noting in this conclusion, based on the merits of this ruling, is that the Supreme Court emphasizes the necessity of the lower courts’ obligation to refer cases of constitutional concern when they are exposed to them in the course of the case to the Constitutional Judicial Chamber of the Supreme Court, as it is a matter related to public order in which the judge does not need to abide by the requests of the opponents. However, this approach actually clashes with the decision of the General Assembly of the Court, the subject of this comment. This position was supported by the Libyan Supreme Court in another appeal No. 152/65 Q dated 4/10/2019 AD when it overturned the ruling of the Benghazi Appeals Court (Administrative Circuit) dated 5/24/2017 No. 244/2017 AD regarding the appeal against the illegality of the Government of National Accord’s decision to form the Board of Directors of the Libyan Investment Authority. In this ruling, the Supreme Court refrained from discussing the legitimacy or constitutionality of the Government of National Accord or not, despite the fact that the issue is a matter of public order, and it would have been more appropriate for the court to seize this opportunity to resolve the constitutional problem regarding the Skhirat Agreement, which has a political origin.
Fifth: The principle of denial of justice
The question that arises in this context: Is the decision of the General Assembly of the Supreme Court, the subject of this comment, considered a violation of the second paragraph of Article (720) of the Civil and Commercial Procedures Law by disputing the judge if he refuses to rule in a case that is valid for judgment and is pending before him?
The answer to this question lies in answering the following questions:
- If the aforementioned decision - even if it is not an explicit decision not to decide on the constitutional appeals registered with the Supreme Court that need to be decided - is not the decision to postpone for an indefinite period, since 2016 until now, and without explaining the reasons for that, a violation of justice?
- Doesn’t the aforementioned decision contradict the text of Article (35) of the Constitutional Declaration issued on 3/3/2011 AD and currently in effect, which stipulates that “litigation is a protected right guaranteed to all people, and every citizen has the right to resort to his natural judge, and the state guarantees bringing the judicial authorities closer to the litigants.” and speedy adjudication of cases “So where is the speed of adjudicating constitutional appeals postponed pursuant to the decision under suspension?
- Does the aforementioned decision not contradict what the Supreme Court itself ruled in a previous appeal in which it faulted the trial court for stopping consideration of a case before it pending the issuance of a third piece of legislation that removes the conflict between two pieces of legislation, according to what the trial court said. The Supreme Court ruled in this regard, saying, “The legislator - even though he removed the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction by Law No. (6) of 1982 AD in supervising the constitutionality of laws - did not prevent the judge from considering the defense of not The validity of another legislation based on its original function of interpreting the law, and in this case he does not have the right to stop consideration of the case while waiting for a third legislation that removes the conflict between them. Because stopping the case in such a case is considered an abstention from deciding on it, which is what the legislator prohibits the judge.” (Civil Appeal No. 3/36, Q.T., dated 12/2/1990).
This... From the foregoing, it becomes clear that the suspended decision of the Supreme Court is, in our view, a denial of justice, to which the text of the second paragraph of Article (720) of the aforementioned Code of Procedure applies. Regardless of filing a dispute lawsuit in this regard on the basis of denial of justice in application of this article, and the concerned party wanted to appeal the decision under comment as it is a final administrative decision subject to appeal before the administrative judiciary, because the Supreme Court adopted the objective standard in accepting appeals against final administrative decisions issued by the judicial authority before the administrative judiciary, then he must either appeal the decision before the body that issued it, which is the Supreme Court, before judicially challenging it. If it does not respond to it within the legal time limit or She responded to him in a way that did not satisfy him, so he will resort to the Administrative Judiciary Department of the Court of Appeal to challenge it with cancellation and compensation. Here two dilemmas arise:
- First: If the decision is appealed before the Administrative Judiciary Department of the Court of Appeal, the advisors of this court will consider the appeal, and they are lower in rank than the advisors of the Supreme Court who issued the decision.. Is it permissible for the lower to follow the actions of the higher?
- Second: Assuming that the ruling of the Court of Appeal issued in the aforementioned decision was appealed before the Supreme Court, and this decision was issued by the General Assembly of the Supreme Court with all its advisors, who will consider this appeal? How will the Supreme Court’s advisors consider a ruling issued by the Court of Appeal related to an administrative decision whose validity they all agree based on a previously decided judicial doctrine?
This problem exists and needs a solution to it, and perhaps in this context we can bring to mind some conclusions from comparative judiciary regarding compensation in some cases for long procedural deadlines when they harm the litigants, according to what the Paris Court of First Instance stated in its ruling issued on 1/18/2010 authorizing the French state due to long procedural deadlines in a labor case, in light of the principles and obligations of European law, as paragraph stipulates The first of Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms stipulates that every person has the right to resort to justice, and his claim must be heard fairly, publicly, and within a reasonable time by the court.
Sixth: A regional/continental court
The African Court has nothing to do with the matter, and we do not have an Arab or Maghreb court, not even under the Islamic League, unlike the case in the European Union countries. The European Court can be resorted to to appeal the decisions of the Supreme National Courts in the event that the Supreme National Courts do not respond to the demands of the litigants and play a judicial role as a watchdog over the national judiciary. This is truly a void in the Libyan legal system that cannot be replaced in this area.
Finally ... In light of this difficult legal dilemma, the various aspects of which we have presented previously, we see that either the Supreme Court will reverse its decision to suspend consideration of the constitutional appeals and consider them in light of the current political and realistic conditions, and issue its rulings, or bear the consequences of denying justice and remain in its current position, waiting for the current conditions to disappear and matters to stabilize in the state, in order to decide on the proposed constitutional appeals. On it.. As we mention this, we do not see that the first or second matter will be achieved in the near future... Let us wait together.
A. Al-Boudiri Ramadan slice
ANasser Al-Mahdi Hamza Al-Hudayri
[1] So it was true at that time - in my capacity (Al-Boudiri) - as a former university professor of constitutional law in Libyan universities, I was surprised by the comments of some legal colleagues who had a distinguished legal legacy of confusion and bias towards political and media disputes without maintaining the same distance from everyone as professionals, which requires us to be independent and professional in expressing our legal point of view. This was my point of view in a speech I called for on 11/27/2014 at the headquarters of (Chattenham House) at the British Foreign Office, in the presence of a number of ambassadors, media professionals, and directors of companies interested in Libyan affairs. And before that, in response to a journalist from a news newspaper (Libya Harold) when I was asked by phone to comment on the ruling in the two days following its issuance, I refused to comment until I obtained a copy of it because I am neither a journalist nor a politician. I asked him to call him as soon as I got a copy of the ruling, and the call took place a week later at that time with the same opinion above.
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